Inferences made about actors influence subsequent processing about those actors. Three experiments conducted in the context of spontaneous trait inference (STI) making demonstrate that such influences occur can either occur via automatic processes or via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that processing goals manipulated prior to encoding actor behavior affected the extent to which STIs automatically influenced subsequent responses but did not alter the extent to which STIs influenced those responses via controlled processes. Results from Experiment 2 showed that the extent to which STIs affected subsequent responding via the action of controlled processes were more affected by a delay between exposure to an actor behavior and the response task than the extent to which STIs affected task performance via the action of automatic processes. Finally, results from Experiment 3 showed that participants' subjective experience of awareness of their trait inferences is related to estimates of the extent to which controlled processing is involved in the production of their future responses but not to estimates of the extent to which those responses are affected by automatic processing.
On reading the sentence "Usually it's hard for me to order at a restaurant because I cannot find anything I like on the menu," people may infer that the informant is picky. This occurs even when people are not instructed to make such inferences and when people do not have an explicit trait-inference-processing goal (Uleman, 1989; Uleman, Blader, & Todorov, 2005 ; but see McCulloch, Ferguson, Kawada, & Bargh, 2008; Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 2009) .
To detect trait inferences made spontaneously during behavior encoding, researchers often employ techniques that attempt to capture evidence of such inferences and simultaneously minimize the possibility that such evidence could be caused by memory for the original trait-implicative behaviors. For example, in pursuit of evidence that people make spontaneous trait inferences (STIs), researchers have used implicit inference measures (e.g., savingsin-relearning, Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995;  false-recognition paradigms, Todorov & Uleman, 2002 , delays of up to 1 week between encoding and testing (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Todorov & Uleman, 2004) , and omission of data from analyses on trials on which participants could remember the original behavior descriptions (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994) . Evidence favoring the production of spontaneous trait inferences has emerged from all of these paradigms. Thus, although the tendency to form STIs can sometimes be avoided or minimized (see Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2003) , the phenomenon seems to be robust.
One issue that has arisen in this research concerns the extent to which a mental representation of actor-relevant information that contains a trait inference is amenable to later use via controlled processing and the extent to which such information might exert an influence automatically. For example, research has shown that traces of the original exposure to the trait-implicative behavior influence subsequent responses despite the fact that neither the original impression nor the behavior on which the impression is based can be consciously recalled (for relevant evidence, see Carlston & Skowronski, 1994) . This suggests the operation of automatic processes. The results of another experiment (Carlston et al., 1995) lead to a similar conclusion. Participants in this experiment were told that the behavior descriptions that were paired with informant photos were actually generated by research assistants at a distant university and had nothing to do with the individuals (depicted by photos) paired with the descriptions. Such instructions reduced the tendency to link trait information implied by the descriptions to the individuals depicted in the photos, a result suggesting that participants' controlled processes were effectively brought to bear to moderate impressions. However, these random pairing instructions did not entirely eliminate the influence that the trait implied by the behavior exerted on trait ratings of those depicted in the photos, which suggests that trait information spontaneously extracted while reading the behavior descriptions automatically influenced subsequent impression responses.
Hence, existing data suggest that both automatic processes and controlled processes affect the influence of STIs on subsequent responding. However, because the studies that collected such data were not explicitly designed to detect such processes, they only provide the most general sort of information about them (e.g., that both processes seem to be involved). It would obviously be of interest to collect specific information about such influences, focusing on those circumstances in which automatic processes might be especially important to subsequent responses and those in which controlled processes might be especially important to subsequent responses. The studies described herein take a step toward providing such information.
Setting the Stage: The False Recognition Paradigm
To provide such evidence, the studies described herein employ a false-recognition paradigm (Todorov & Uleman, 2002 . In this paradigm, participants either see actors paired with behavior descriptions that both imply and contain a trait word (Example 1) or see actors paired with behavior descriptions that imply, but do not contain, a trait word (Example 2):
Example 1: I am picky because I refuse to try a new brand of beer.
Example 2: I refuse to try a new brand of beer.
Later, participants see the actor paired with a trait word (e.g., picky) and decide whether or not the trait word actually appeared in the previously seen behavior describing that actor. "Yes" responses-decisions that a trait word was shown earlier-can be either hits or false recognitions. A hit reflects a "yes" response to a trial in which the trait word actually appeared in the behavior description. A false recognition reflects a "yes" response to a trial when the trait word did not appear in the behavior description.
Although false recognitions are suggestive of STI formation, the contributions of controlled processes and automatic processes to such responses are unclear. For example, correct recognitions (hits) can occur via two qualitatively distinct processes. In one process, participants consciously recall the behavior description and remember that the trait word was shown (e.g., Actor X was paired with Behavior Y that contained Trait Z), and use that information to produce a correct response. Because participants have awareness of the recalled information, this response reflects controlled processing. However, in the second process, participants may encode the trait information such that the trait is stored as a property of the actor (e.g., Trait Z is a property of Actor X). When prompted to make a recognition decision, this trait information may be not be consciously recalled but may be implicitly available, favoring a correct recognition decision but without participant awareness. Such influence reflects the action of automatic processes. On these trials the controlled processes and automatic processes work in concert, so reliance on either process, or both, will produce a correct recognition. Now imagine that a participant is exposed to a sentence that does not contain the trait term, but the participant forms an STI at behavior encoding. We believe that the participant's mental representation of the actor should again reflect the fact that the trait is stored as a property of the actor (e.g., Trait Z is a property of Actor X). However, some may question whether the mental representation of the actor formed when the trait appears in the behavior descriptions is the same as when the trait does not appear in the sentence but is spontaneously inferred. For example, Bassili (1989) might argue that in the spontaneous inference case, the mental representation of the actor may simply reflect the formation of an actor-trait association (Trait Y -Actor X) instead of an inference (Trait Y is a property of Actor X). Following Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, and Crawford (1998) , we argue that that the trait information about an the actor in STI is encoded into the semantic representation of an actor so that it is identical to when the trait is explicitly provided as part of the behavior description (also see Skowronski, Carlston, & Hartnett, 2008) .
More important is that this representation could influence subsequent responding either via the action of controlled processes or via the action of automatic processes. For example, as in the case in which the trait was actually in the sentence, this representation might be used to produce a "yes" response (now a false recognition) automatically, without consciously recalling the inference. Moreover, the likelihood that such a false recognition would be produced would increase if the participant could not consciously recall the original sentence (e.g., Actor X was paired with Behavior Y that did not contain Trait Z); such explicit recall should work to produce a correct "no" response. Therefore, false recognitions occur when automatic processes implicitly favor a "yes" response and controlled processes fail to produce the correct "no" response. In other words, on these trials the controlled and automatic processes work in opposition.
The extant research using the false-recognition paradigm demonstrates that manipulating experimental conditions may affect the frequency with which both hits and false recognitions are produced (e.g., Rim et al., 2009 ). However, our arguments suggest that these experiments are silent as to the affect these manipulations have on the processes implicated in the production of these results. That is, recognition task performance is due to contributions from controlled and automatic processes; however, the absolute frequency of hits and false alarms cannot determine the magnitude of these contributions.
Fortunately, the interplay of automatic processes and controlled processes within the domain of STI expression can be more formally investigated using the process dissociation procedure (PDP; e.g., Payne, 2005) . This procedure allows one to quantify how much of an observation is attributable to the action of controlled processes and how much of an observation is attributable to the action of automatic processes. Accordingly, the current experiments use the PDP to quantify the extent to which automatic processes and controlled processes contribute to the expression of spontaneously inferred traits.
The Logic of the Process Dissociation Procedure
The goal of research using the PDP approach is that given the right experimental design, researchers can quantify the contributions of controlled processes and automatic processes to an observed phenomenon (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) . This can be accomplished by creating an experiment with two conditions: An inclusion task, in which controlled processes and automatic processes work in concert, and an exclusion task, in which the two process types work in opposition.
The PDP model assumes that performance on the inclusion task can be due either to controlled processes or, when controlled processes fail, to automatic processes. This can be described mathematically:
In the exclusion task, performance is the joint function of automatic processes and the failure of controlled processing. This can also be expressed mathematically:
Given these depictions, the extent to which controlled processing influences task performance can be calculated from recognition data by taking the difference between observed performance in the inclusion task and observed performance in the exclusion task:
Moreover, the extent to which automatic processes exert an influence on task performance can then be calculated from recognition data by dividing observed performance in the exclusion condition by a term reflecting the failure of controlled processes:
Two major assumptions underlie these formulations. The first is that automatic processes and controlled processes exert influence in concert with one another in the inclusion condition to the same degree as they exert influence in opposition to one another in the exclusion condition. The second assumption is that automatic processes and controlled processes are not only qualitatively distinct but independent of one another (e.g., Jacoby & Shrout, 1997) . It is important to note that these assumptions have been documented empirically by showing that certain experimental manipulations selectively affect one process but not the other (see Payne & Bishara, 2009 , for a review).
A concrete example shows how this procedure can be applied to data from a social psychology experiment. In a study by Payne (2001) , participants attempted to identify an object presented on a computer screen as either a gun or a tool. Objects were immediately preceded by a white face or a black face. The faces were thought to automatically activate race-related stereotypes that could influence response tendencies. For some trials, the stereotype activated by the face was congruent with the to-be-identified object (e.g., a gun preceded by a black face). These were designated as congruent trials because when a black face preceded a gun, a participant could respond "gun" either because of a controlled process or because of an automatic process that occurred when controlled processing fails. Incongruent trials were those in which a tool was preceded by a black face. In these, controlled processes (wanting to respond "tool") worked in opposition to automatic processes (wanting to respond "gun" after seeing a black face). Payne (2001) used the recognition data generated by the guntool task to derive mathematical estimates of controlled processing and automatic processing. His results showed that estimates of controlled processing and automatic processing were affected differently by alternative experimental manipulations. For example, requiring participants to respond quickly greatly affected the controlled processing parameter estimate but not the automatic processing parameter estimate.
Within the domain of social psychology, the PDP approach has now been applied to topics such as decision making (e.g., Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006) , stereotypes (Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995) , and memory (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; see Payne & Bishara, 2009 , for a review). In the present research, consistent with an analysis provided by Uleman et al. (2005) , we attempt to apply the PDP perspective to the data derived from spontaneous inference studies. By dissecting the data yielded by the false recognition paradigm using the PDP approach, we can quantify the contributions of the extent to which both automatic processes and controlled processes influence participant responding. Moreover, as Payne (2001) did, we can explore how these estimates vary across experimental conditions that might be more likely to impact controlled processing or conditions that might be more likely to impact automatic processing.
General Method: Experiments 1 and 2
We explored these ideas in three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants in an exposure task viewed photographbehavior dyads. Randomly selected photographs appeared in the upper half of the computer screen and first-person-worded narrative behavior descriptions appeared in the lower half. Each of these dyads appeared for 10 s. Presentation was paced by the computer.
Half of the behaviors explicitly included a trait word that captured the essence of the behavior (e.g., I am grumpy because people just annoy me. It seems like wherever I go that I am surrounded by idiots). The other half of the behaviors merely implied that the speaker possessed a trait but did not include a trait word (e.g., People just annoy me. It seems like wherever I go that I am surrounded by idiots). For Experiments 1 and 2, whether a behavior explicitly contained a trait word or merely implied a trait word was randomized across behaviors; therefore, any variance due to particular behaviors could not systematically affect the results.
In a later task, participants were shown the same photographs that were paired with the behaviors in the exposure task. This time the photographs were each paired with a trait word. Participants had to indicate ("yes" or "no") whether the word actually appeared in the behavior previously shown with photograph in the exposure task. When the trait word actually did appear in the exposure task, a "yes" response was correct; when the trait word did not appear in the exposure task, a "no" response was correct. Participants' performance on trials in which the trait word was presented and was correctly identified constitutes the hit rate (a higher hit rate indicates a higher proportion of correct responses). Performance on trials on which the trait was not presented, but on which people erroneously responded "yes," constitutes the false recognition rate (a higher value reflects a higher rate of false recognition responses).
In these experiments, the trials on which the trait actually appeared (leading to the hit rate calculation) are equivalent to inclusion trials: Controlled processes and automatic processes favor the same response, with the use of either leading to a correct response. In other words, correctly identifying a previously shown trait word can be influenced either by the informant photo prompting exact recall of the behavior (controlled process) or by implicit processes that rely on the linkage formed at encoding between a photo and a trait word (automatic process). Conversely, trials on which the trait was not in the sentence (leading to the calculation of false recognitions) serve as exclusion trials. On these trials, participants' automatic processes (implicit processes tapping into trait inferences linked to photos) work in opposition to their controlled processes (photos prompting memory for the exact wording of the behavior, which can then be used to provide the correct "no" response).
As noted earlier in this article, the PDP framework allows one to calculate parameter estimates for controlled processing and for automatic processing from these trials. In two of our experiments we were interested in whether the parameter estimates derived from the PDP approach changed in sensible ways in response to experimental manipulations.
In Experiment 1, prior to exposure to the behavior descriptions, different groups of participants were given different processing goals. Some of these goals have been shown to interfere with inference making (i.e., searching for graphemes). The logic of this manipulation is straightforward: Weakening the trait inferences made at encoding should minimize the automatic effects of those inferences on performance of a trait recognition task. However, this weakening should not interfere much with conscious attempts to recall such information. Thus, we hypothesized that our inference-interfering processing goals should be especially likely to reduce automatic processing parameter estimates but not controlled processing parameter estimates.
In Experiment 2 we attempted to show that the parameter estimate for controlled processing could be altered by a manipulation that left the automatic processing parameter estimate relatively unaffected. Prompted by an analysis provided by Uleman et al. (2005) , this experiment imposed a delay between the original exposure task and the recognition task. Conscious recall decreases rapidly with an increasing lag between encoding and a recognition test (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885 Ebbinghaus, /1964 . Because the operation of controlled processes in our paradigm depends on conscious recall of past actor behaviors, these processes should be especially affected by such delays. Conversely, implicit knowledge thought to drive automatic processes should be relatively unaffected by temporal delays (see Carlston & Skowronski, 1994) . Thus, we expected that the automatic processing parameter estimates observed in Experiment 2 should not be affected by delay but that estimates of controlled processing should be.
However, one concern with the PDP approach is that calculated parameter estimates for a given participant can occasionally have values below 0. This is a problem because it is theoretically impossible for either automatic processing or controlled processing to have less-than-zero influence on subsequent responding. Because of this theoretical impossibility, in Experiments 1 and 2 participants whose calculated estimates of controlled processing were negative (i.e., a false-recognition rate greater than hit rate) were recoded as having zero controlled processing prior to calculating automatic processing. Likewise, participants with negative estimates of automatic processing were recoded as having zero automatic processing.
One other concern with using the PDP approach concerns the extent to which participant guessing tendencies might affect parameter estimates. Guessing occurs when responses reflect neither the action of automatic processes nor the action of controlled processes. Instead, guessing tendencies could reflect participant response biases (e.g., a tendency to say "yes"). Such guessing tendencies were assessed in our studies by examining responses on trials on which no trait-relevant actor information was provided:
The to-be-recognized trait did not appear in the behavior description, nor was it implied by the description. We refer to these trials as mismatch trials, and we could use them to assess response bias (e.g., a tendency to say "yes" or "no") in each participant.
Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus on whether one should correct for guessing in the PDP approach, and if one should, what the best approach might be. Accordingly, we calculated the PDP parameter estimates in three different ways. In one set of analyses we calculated the parameter estimates without correcting for participant guessing. A second set of analyses used a guessing correction based on the idea that our estimates of automatic processes are due to the influence of memory (M) plus response bias (B); therefore, A ϭ M ϩ B. Thus, the correction procedure for this method is to subtract the "yes" response rate on mismatch trials from the estimates of automatic processing (Jacoby et al., 1993) . We refer to this as the difference score approach. A third set of analyses used corrected parameter estimates derived from the idea that guessing is probabilistic (e.g., Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plünnecke, 1995) . We refer to this as the probabilistic correction approach. In this approach, the probability of a "yes" response in the absence of both controlled and automatic processing can be expressed mathematically as
By including a guessing parameter we can account for guessing when calculating inclusion task performance in the following manner:
Inclusion Task Performance ͑accounting for guessing͒
Exclusion task performance can be adjusted for guessing in a similar manner:
Exclusion Task Performance ͑accounting for guessing͒
The implication of such ideas is that the calculation for controlled processing can remain unchanged (C ϭ Inclusion Ϫ Exclusion) from that specified by the original PDP approach. However, the calculation for the automatic processing parameter estimate changes to
In general, the method that we used to calculate the parameter estimates did not alter the inferential conclusions derived from our analyses. However, because each approach to guessing has its own devotees, because the presentation of only a single set of estimates might incorrectly imply our endorsement of that approach, and because we wanted to be as transparent in our handling of the data and the analyses as possible, we present the results of analyses conducted on all three sets of calculated PDP estimates.
Experiment 1
Past research has shown that searching for graphemes during behavior description encoding inhibits the false recognition of traits relative to participants without such processing goals (Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994) . In theory, this result has been interpreted as evidence that the grapheme task inhibits to formation of STIs. However, it is unclear whether this decrease in the rate of false recognitions indicates a decrease in the influence of automatic processes on responding or an increase in the influence of controlled processes. We hypothesize that the inhibition of STI formation (via having participants search for graphemes during behavior encoding) should largely express itself by reducing the contributions of automatic processes to recognition task performance. We suspect that the inhibition of STI formation should not affect the contributions of controlled processes to recognition task performance.
Method

Subjects.
One-hundred twenty-two participants completed Experiment 1 in partial fulfillment of a course research requirement.
1 Procedure. During Experiment 1, participants were exposed to 48 photograph-behavior dyads: 24 explicit trait trials and 24 implied trait trials. These behaviors were counterbalanced such that when collapsed across all participants, a behavior appeared an equal number of times as an explicit trial and as an implicit trial.
Before seeing the dyads, participants received one of three instructions: Some were merely told to read the behaviors (STI condition), some were told to form an impression (impression formation condition), and some were told to ignore the meaning of the behaviors and to search for the letters ch (grapheme condition, which should interfere with STI formation).
After a short filler task (ϳ5 min), participants saw the 48 photographs shown earlier in the upper half of the computer screen; a trait word appeared in the lower half. In this recognition task, the participants decided whether the trait word was included in the behavior description that was paired with the photograph in the exposure task. On 12 trials, the trait words were actually shown with the photograph earlier (explicit match), and on 12 trials, the trait words were implied by the behavior description but did not appear in the description (implied match). On the remaining 24 trials, the trait words that were presented neither were implied by the exposure task behavior descriptions nor appeared in those descriptions (mismatch); responses in this condition reflect guessing. Participants were then thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Recognition task performance.
For each participant, the percentage of trials on which participants responded "yes" was separately tabulated for the each of the three trial types. These percentages were analyzed using a 3 (trial type: hit, false recognition, mismatch; within-participants) ϫ 3 (instruction: STI vs. impression formation vs. grapheme; between-participants) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The interaction was significant, F(4, 238) ϭ 6.778, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .087, as was the main effect of trial type, F(2, 238) ϭ 334.958, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .735. The main effect for the instruction variable approached significance, F(2, 119) ϭ 2.79, p ϭ .065, 2 ϭ .029. The means for the trial type main effect show that rates of "yes" responses were high in the hit rate condition (M ϭ 0.75, SD ϭ 0.14) and the false recognition condition (M ϭ 0.62, SD ϭ 0.21), but low in the mismatch condition (M ϭ 0.28, SD ϭ 0.16). The higher "yes" rate in the hit rate condition than in the false recognition condition suggests that people may have been able, to some extent, to use recall to override their automatic tendency to use their inferences to respond, t(121) ϭ 7.050, p Ͻ .01, Cohen's d ϭ 0.72. However, the substantially higher rate of "yes" responding in the false recognition condition than in the mismatch condition shows that these attempts at control were often unsuccessful, t(121) ϭ 16.108, p Ͻ .01, Cohen's d ϭ 1.87. Additionally, the rate at which participants responded yes in the mismatch condition was substantially greater than 0, t(121) ϭ 18.938, p Ͻ .01, suggesting that it might be important to account for this tendency when calculating the PDP estimates.
The means for the significant Trial Type ϫ Instruction interaction (see Table 1 ) show that the rate at which "yes" responses were provided did not substantially differ for participants who received impression formation instructions and those who were in the STI condition. However, it was the data for those participants in the grapheme condition that were especially affected by instruction manipulation, and it was the data from these participants that were largely responsible for the significant interaction. This perception was verified in a subsidiary analysis in which the data from participants in the grapheme condition were dropped; in this analysis, the Trial Type ϫ Instruction interaction was no longer significant, F(2, 119) ϭ .221, ns. These results suggest two conclusions. First, participants in the STI condition were making inferences to the same extent as participants in the impression formation condition. Second, the grapheme instructions were effective in undermining the tendency to make trait inferences.
PDP analyses. The estimates of controlled and automatic processing were calculated as described above. Table 2 displays the parameter estimates for the different methods used to correct for participant guessing tendencies. The patterns of means are similar, regardless of how participant guessing is treated in the calculation of the PDP estimates. Treating participant guessing as probabilistic appeared to be the most conservative approach to the data; therefore, we discuss the results from the analyses using these estimates. The automatic processing and the controlled processing parameter estimates were examined in separate ANOVAs. The sole variable in each ANOVA was the between-participants instruction condition (STI, impression formation, grapheme).
Results of the analyses revealed that the estimates of controlled processing did not differ across the three pre-encoding instruction conditions, F(2, 119) ϭ 0.042, ns (see Figure 1) . However, the automatic processing parameter estimates were substantially influenced by the pre-encoding instructions, F(2, 119) ϭ 16.595, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .213 (see Figure 2) . Results of subsidiary analyses showed that the automatic processing parameter estimates did not differ for those in the STI (M ϭ 0.68, SD ϭ 0.21) and impression formation (M ϭ 0.69, SD ϭ 0.20) conditions (Tukey's HSD, p ϭ .974). However, the estimates of the automatic processing parameter were higher in both of these conditions than the estimates obtained from subjects in the grapheme condition (M ϭ 0.43, SD ϭ 0.25; both Tukey's HSD, p Ͻ .01).
These data suggest that (a) the influence of trait inferences made at encoding on later responses was not entirely inhibited by controlled processes; (b) uninstructed participants produced data similar to that exhibited by participants with an impression formation goal, indicating that the participants in the former condition made trait inferences spontaneously; and (c) an alternative processing goal present during encoding (i.e., searching for graphemes) significantly reduced the automatic influence of traits on subsequent responding. The low estimates of automatic processing observed in the grapheme condition diminished those participants' correct (hits) and incorrect (false alarms) recognitions because automatic processes contribute to both. Moreover, these conclusions are uninfluenced by subject guessing: They emerge regardless of whether, or how, one accounts for guessing when calculating the parameter estimates.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to extend the results of the first study by showing, as Payne (2001) did, that some manipulations could inhibit controlled processing (and lower controlled processing parameter estimates) without substantially affecting automatic processing. The manipulation that we chose was to vary the delay between the exposure task and the recognition task. Explicit memory decays rapidly with delay (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1885 Ebbinghaus, /1964 , so mental processes that depend on such memory (e.g., controlled processes) should become increasingly impotent with delay. Hence, after a long delay it should be especially difficult to use controlled processes to correct or bypass the response tendencies prompted by automatic processes. In contrast, knowledge that operates automatically is often relatively immune to long delays between learning and test. Moreover, trait knowledge that is acquired at encoding is expected to affect recognition responding, even after a long lag (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994) .
Method
Subjects.
One-hundred and eighty-five participants completed Experiment 2 and were compensated with credit toward a course research requirement.
Procedure. Participants were seated at individual workstations and told to follow all of the instructions delivered by the computer. Participants were told that their initial task would be to complete a word identification study. The intent of this task was simply to expose the participants to 12 trait words that would be used in a later filler task. This was done by showing either a trait word (e.g., honest) or a letter string (e.g., diourg) in the middle of Note. The cells represent the parameter estimates for Experiment 1. The uncorrected estimates assume zero as a baseline and use the formulas C ϭ Inclusion Performance Ϫ Exclusion Performance and A ϭ Exclusion Performance/(1 Ϫ C). The difference score procedure assumes that A estimates are the sum of automatic processes and guessing. Therefore, the difference score correction is calculated by subtracting participants' mismatch rate from A estimates. Finally, assuming that guessing is the probability of answering yes in the absence of controlled and automatic processes yields the final parameter estimates. The formulas for these are found in the introduction section. STI ϭ spontaneous trait inference. the computer screen. Then participants decided, by pressing a button, whether the letter string formed a word or not. Participants completed 24 of these trials: 12 trait words and 12 non-trait-word letter strings. After completing the first task, participants read instructions explaining that they would see photographs paired with behaviors. During this second task, participants were instructed to read the behaviors but, importantly, they were not instructed to form impressions.
Participants then saw 48 photograph-behavior dyads: Twelve of the behaviors included a trait word (explicit trials); 12 behaviors implied but did not include the trait word (implied trials); and 24 control trial behaviors did not include or imply a trait word (e.g., I had a ham and cheese sandwich for lunch). The same 24 control trials were used for all of the participants. The behaviors for the explicit trials and the implied trials were counterbalanced such that when collapsed across all participants a behavior appeared as an explicit trial and as an implicit trial an equal number of times.
After seeing 48 photograph-behavior dyads and completing a short filler task of approximately 5 min duration, half of the participants (long delay) completed approximately 20 min more of filler tasks. These filler tasks included seeing 24 photographs from the second task that were randomly paired with one of the 12 trait words from the first task or one of 12 novel trait words. Participants had to decide if these trait words were shown during the word identification task or not. The goal of this task was to provide a filled delay that would be especially effective at interfering with these subjects' recall for the material presented in the second task, which should substantially impair controlled processing. The other half of the subjects (short delay) did not encounter this interference, so they should experience a smaller reduction in their ability to use controlled processing.
Finally, all participants were instructed that they would see some of the photographs viewed earlier and would complete a short task. In this task, 24 photographs from the second task that were not shown as part of the filler task were shown, one at a time, in the upper half of the screen with a trait word shown in the lower half. The participants' task was to decide ("yes" or "no") if the trait word was shown with the photograph earlier: Six of these trials presented trait words that were implied by the behaviors shown with the photograph earlier (false recognition trials), six were trait words that actually appeared in the behaviors earlier paired with the photographs (hits), and 12 were traits that were not implied or explicit in the behaviors shown with the photographs earlier (mismatch trials). Note that (in contrast to Experiment 1) only half of the photographs from the second task (i.e., exposure to the photograph-behavior dyads) were used in the false-recognition task; the other half appeared in the filler tasks. However, our design was fully counterbalanced so that, across subjects, the target photographs appeared in the filler task and in the falserecognition task an equal number of times.
Results and Discussion
Recognition task performance. The percentage of trials in which participants responded "yes" to the question "Was this trait word shown in the behavior paired with this photograph earlier?" was calculated for the different trial types. These scores were entered into a 3 (trial type: false recognitions, hits, mismatch; within-participants) ϫ 2 (delay: short delay, long delay; betweenparticipants) ANOVA.
The analysis yielded a main effect for trial type, F(2, 366) ϭ 162.76, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .470; see Table 3 for participant performance means that was marginally qualified by delay, interaction F(2, 366) ϭ 2.385, p ϭ .094, 2 ϭ .007. There was no main effect of delay, F(1, 183) ϭ 0.098, ns.
Post hoc, pairwise analyses conducted on the means for trial type main effect found that the rates of "yes" responses produced differed on hit (M ϭ 0.69, SD ϭ 0.23) and false recognition (M ϭ 0.57, SD ϭ 0.26; Tukey's HSD, p Ͻ .01) trials. These analyses also showed that the rate of "yes" responses produced differed on false recognition and mismatch trials (M ϭ 0.29, SD ϭ 0.20; Tukey's HSD, p Ͻ .01).
This pattern of means is telling. The fact that the false recognition rate is lower than the hit rate suggests some level of success at using controlled processes to inhibit the influence of trait inferences that may have been made during exposure to behaviors on trait recognition. However, the high false recognition rate suggests that despite these attempts at control, participant attempts at recognition may have been influenced by their spontaneous trait inferences. This inability to inhibit the influence of the trait inferences on such false recognition trials is explored in greater detail in the analysis described below.
PDP analysis. The results for the parameter estimates calculated from the PDP framework are presented in Table 4 . The patterns of means are unchanged regardless of how participant guessing is accounted for. The most conservative calculations came from using participants' guessing as probabilistic. We present these results below.
The controlled processing parameter estimates and the automatic processing estimates for each subject were separately examined via t tests comparing parameter estimates obtained in the short-delay condition to the parameter estimates obtained in the long-delay condition.
The results of the analysis of the controlled processing estimates showed that, as expected, estimates were lower for those that encountered the 20-min filled delay (M ϭ 0.15, SD ϭ 0.15) than for those that encountered the short delay (M ϭ 0.22, SD ϭ 0.25), t(183) ϭ 2.14, p Ͻ .05, Cohen's d ϭ 0.32 (see Figure 3 ). This effect is especially interesting because simple examination of the "yes" rates produced in the various conditions would have suggested that the delay manipulation had minimal effect on responding. The PDP estimates obviously tell a different story. In comparison, the estimates of automatic processing did not differ between the two delay conditions, long delay (M ϭ 0.51, SD ϭ 0.35); short delay (M ϭ 0.58, SD ϭ 0.32); t(183) ϭ 1.35, ns (see Figure 4) . Hence, as expected, the delay seemed to impair the influence of controlled processes on the recognition task, but not the influence of automatic processes on the task.
Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 3 was to help validate the utility of the PDP approach by assessing the extent to which these estimates are related to judgment confidence, a measure that should reflect the extent to which participants are aware of how they came to their judgments. In theory, controlled processes can be accompanied by awareness of such processes; automatic processes should not be accompanied by such awareness (see Payne, Jacoby, & Lambert, 2004; Payne, Shimizu, & Jacoby, 2005 , Experiment 1).
To examine this idea, in Experiment 3 participants completed a false-recognition task similar to the ones used in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 participants also reported their confidence in their decisions. If automatic processes are impervious to conscious awareness, then there should be no relationship between calculated parameter estimates of automatic processing and participants' reported judgment confidence. Conversely, one of the characteristics of controlled processes is that people can be aware of such processes. Therefore, we expect participants' reported confidence to be positively related to the calculated controlled process parameter estimates.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-three participants (15 women, eight men, M age ϭ 19.09, SD ϭ 1.31; age range, 18 -24 years) completed Experiment 3 in partial fulfillment of a course research requirement.
Procedure. Participants were seated at individual work stations and told they would be viewing behaviors on a computer screen. They were also told that they would be asked a few questions about each behavior. After participants indicated they understood the instructions, the experiment began.
A behavior appeared for 10 s in the center of the computer screen (no photographs were shown in this experiment). Twentyfour of the behaviors explicitly mentioned a trait word, 24 implied but did not include a trait word, and 28 behaviors neither implied nor included a trait word (e.g., I listened to music on the drive home). Counterbalancing was used to ensure that across all participants, a behavior appeared an equal number of times as an explicit trial and as an implied trial. Note. The cells represent the percentage of "yes" responses during the recognition task in Experiment 2. The false recognition rate reflects trials on which the trait word was implied by but not shown in the behavior shown with the photograph earlier in the experiment. The hit rate reflects trials on which the trait word actually was presented in the behavior description shown with the photograph earlier. Finally, the mismatch rate reflects trials on which the trait word was neither implied by nor appeared in the behavior shown with the photograph earlier. Note. The cells represent the parameter estimates for Experiment 2. The uncorrected estimates assume zero as a baseline. The difference score correction procedure scores assume that A estimates are the sum of automatic processes and participant guessing; therefore, these scores are calculated by subtracting participant mismatch rates from A estimates. Finally, the probability correction procedure assumes that participant guessing is probabilistic. The formulae used for the probability correction procedure are found in the introduction section.
Immediately after seeing each behavior, a new screen appeared. A word appeared in the center of the computer screen, and participants indicated whether or not the trait word appeared in the behavior presented on the previous screen. As in Experiments 1 and 2, when the trait word actually appeared in the behavior, a "yes" response was correct. This correct response could be reached either by remembering that the trait word appeared in the behavior or by recognizing that the trait word was implied by the behavior. These trials served as our inclusion trials for the PDP estimates. Likewise, the trials in which the trait word was implied but not shown served as our exclusion trials for the PDP estimates. In these, responding "yes" to the question, "Was this word shown in the behavior on the previous screen?" was incorrect. We note that in Experiment 3 participants made their recognition decisions immediately after reading the behavior; earlier studies imposed a delay between exposure and test. The absence of delay used in Experiment 3 provides maximal opportunity to recall the exact wording of the behavior description, which on exclusion trials should minimize false recognitions.
After deciding ("yes" or "no") whether the word appeared in the previous behavior description, participants indicated how confident they were in their choice on a 3-point scale (1 ϭ guessing, 2 ϭ somewhat confident, or 3 ϭ very confident). The scale was displayed on the screen; the confidence rating was made by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. Finally, our intent was to use the control trials as we had in Experiments 1 and 2: To obtain an estimate of a base rate frequency of "yes" responding that could be used to adjust the calculation of the automatic parameter estimate and the controlled parameter estimate. On these control trials, following the 28 neutral behaviors, participants were asked whether common words appeared in the previous behaviors (e.g., with, the, an, a, and) . Unfortunately, due to a programming error we could not reliably tabulate the rate at which participants responded "yes" to these items. Therefore, the Experiment 3 results present the results of parameter estimates calculated from data that are unadjusted for guessing.
Results and Discussion
The percentage of "yes" responses for each trial type was calculated within each level of self-reported confidence. These means were analyzed in a 2 (trial type: hit, false recognition; within-participants) ϫ 3 (confidence rating: guessing, somewhat confident, very confident; withinparticipants) hierarchical pooled within-subjects regression analysis. This analysis was used instead of an ANOVA because it tolerates missing cells. Otherwise, the analysis works much like a within-subjects ANOVA; the between-subjects variance is extracted prior to evaluating the within-subjects effects. The effects of interest in the analysis are then evaluated hierarchically in two regression models. One model contains only the main effects, which are simultaneously evaluated; the second model contains the interaction and evaluates it controlling for the main effects.
The results of the analysis showed that the main effect for participants' self-reported confidence rating was not significant, F(2, 99) ϭ 1.30, ns. However, a main effect for trial type emerged, F(1, 99) ϭ 68.66, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .314. Participants responded "yes" much more frequently when the trait word actually appeared in the behavior (hits; M ϭ 0.64, SD ϭ 0.35) than when the trait was merely implied (false recognitions; M ϭ 0.16, SD ϭ 0.29).
However, this trial type main effect was qualified by a significant Trial Type ϫ Confidence Rating interaction, F(2, 97) ϭ 12.00, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .094 (see Table 5 ). This interaction was explored by first comparing the hit rates across the different levels of confidence. Participants' hit rate increased as their self-reported confidence increased (guessing: M ϭ 0.44, SD ϭ 0.44; somewhat confident: M ϭ 0.58, SD ϭ 0.32; very confident: M ϭ 0.86, SD ϭ 0.11), F(2, 40) ϭ 10.42, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .204. We also compared participants' false recognition rates across the different levels of confidence. The false recognition rate was much lower when participants reported being very confident in their decision (M ϭ 0.04, SD ϭ 0.10) than when they reported being somewhat confident (M ϭ 0.24, SD ϭ 0.34) and when they reported that they were guessing (M ϭ 0.23, SD ϭ 0.36), F(2, 35) ϭ 3.40, p Ͻ .05, 2 ϭ .070. These results demonstrate that as self-reported confidence increased, decision accuracy improved. This was especially true when participants reported being very confident in their decision. Note. These cells represent the percentage of "yes" responses within each level of self-reported confidence for Experiment 3. The number within each cell varies because some participants did not report any trials at a particular level of confidence (total sample size for Experiment 4 was N ϭ 23).
For these trials, participants correctly identified the traits that were actually shown in a full 86% of the trials. Likewise, participants falsely recognized a trait as actually being shown in only 4% of the trials. PDP analysis. The percentage of "yes" responses was calculated for the inclusion and exclusion trials within each reported level of confidence. These were used to separately calculate for each participant a controlled process estimate and automatic process estimate within each level of confidence. As explained above, these data are unadjusted for participant guessing; however, this may not be too unfortunate. The different methods for guessing corrections used in Studies 1 and 2 did little to affect the pattern of means from our PDP estimates; we have no reason to believe that the same would not hold for the current study. Estimates of controlled and automatic processing were separately analyzed in two one-way ANOVAs with level of confidence as the sole predictor.
As predicted, the controlled processes parameter estimates were related to participants' reported level of confidence, F(2, 22) ϭ 14.74, p Ͻ .01, 2 ϭ .290. The parameter estimates were largest when participants reported that they were very confident (M ϭ 0.82, SD ϭ 0.18) in their choice; the estimates were smaller when participants were somewhat confident (M ϭ 0.34, SD ϭ 0.33) or were merely guessing (M ϭ 0.38, SD ϭ 0.44). The same pattern was not observed for estimates of automatic processing, F(2, 22) ϭ 1.73, ns. The automatic processing parameter estimates did not differ across trials on which participants reported they were merely guessing (M ϭ 0.27, SD ϭ 0.41), were somewhat confident (M ϭ 0.31, SD ϭ 0.39), or were very confident (M ϭ 0.12, SD ϭ 0.21).
Taken together, it appears that participants' confidence ratings did reflect awareness of controlled processes but not automatic processes. This result is especially suggestive given that the current experiment imposed no delay between reading the behaviors and deciding whether or not a trait word was shown. The fact that spontaneously inferred traits led to false recognitions, even with no delay, attests to the power of such inferences in automatically guiding subsequent responding.
General Discussion
The studies presented in this article have implications for both the question of whether people form STIs and the question of how such inferences impact subsequent responding.
Implications of the Research for the STI Issue
STI research has often been confronted with the question of how one detects inferences without directly asking for them. The response of STI researchers has been to use subtle or implicit methods to detect inference formation. However, one disadvantage of these methods is that results obtained using such methods are open to alternative interpretations. For example, Bassili (e.g., Brown & Bassili, 2002) has argued that the results obtained using such methods can reflect the formation of actor-trait associations, and do not necessarily reflect on-line inferences made about the actor.
In response to this criticism, one of the main thrusts of STI research has been to show that when confronted with traitimplicative information, peoples' responses when they are uninstructed resemble the responses of those who are instructed to form trait impressions. It is argued that similarity in the responses provided by subjects in these two conditions suggests that uninstructed subjects formed spontaneous inferences about actors (see Skowronski et al., 2008) . Such similarity between uninstructed and explicitly instructed participants is characteristic of the data of all of the experimental work on the topic (see Uleman et al., 2005) , which is why the pro-STI position has achieved a position of substantial acceptance. The data presented in the present article certainly add to the data showing such similarity.
However, the data in the present article take this similarity in a new direction. That is, our data document similarity not only on measures designed to detect the presence of trait inferences, as in the bulk of the STI research, but also on measures that reflect how inferences might affect subsequent processing. In our research, not only did uninstructed subjects produce responses that resembled those who were instructed to form impressions but the parameter estimates provided by the PDP analyses suggested that the contribution of automatic processes and controlled processes to the influence of those inferences on subsequent responses was also similar across the two instruction conditions.
Implications of the Research for Conceptions of Trait-Driven Information Processing
Our experiments demonstrated that STIs can affect subsequent responding via automatic processes. Further, these influences occur independently of memory for the behaviors on which these impressions are based. These conclusions are a consequence of using the PDP to quantify the contributions of these processes to subsequent recognition task performance.
In addition, employing the PDP framework allowed us to capture the interplay between these two processes and to identify conditions that affect how these processes are expressed. The results of Experiment 1 show that estimates of the extent to which automatic processes influence subsequent responses can be diminished when people search for graphemes during exposure to written descriptions of trait-implicative actor behavior. This reduction might be seen by some as a puzzle. That is, some might ask, "If processing is automatic, then how can instructions at encoding influence or diminish such processes?" Our data suggest that the answer to this question lies in the extent to which our manipulations were related to strength of the initial trait inferences: The grapheme manipulation used in Experiment 1 weakened the initial inferences generated from actor behaviors. We argue that it is this weakening that resulted in a lowering of the automatic processing parameter estimates in this condition relative to the magnitude of the parameter estimates observed in the other conditions of the experiments. In our view, this makes perfect sense: Weak constructs ought to have less impact on subsequent responding than strong constructs.
Of additional interest is that the manipulations used in Experiment 1 successfully altered the parameter estimates of automatic processing while leaving unaffected the parameter estimates for controlled processing. Such a result points to the independent influences of automatic processes and controlled processes on responding in the recognition task employed in Experiment 1. This independence, which has also been documented in other work (see Sherman et al., 2008) was also supported by the results of Experiment 2. The results from that experiment suggested that an inference-test delay could affect estimates of controlled processing while leaving estimates of automatic processing relatively unaffected. The idea underlying this manipulation was that the effective use of controlled processing depends on good explicit memory for the content of the original behavior descriptions. These decay rapidly with time, so they become more difficult to use with time. In comparison, the trait knowledge inferred from the behaviors is thought to decay relatively slowly. Such slow decay should be reflected in the continued influence of trait inferences on subsequent responses across time. This idea was supported by the automatic parameter estimates that we obtained.
One other implication of our data is that they support the claim that many dependent measures are often not process pure (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) . That is, some have assumed that so-called implicit measures (such as the false-recognition measure used in our experiments) largely reflect the action of automatic processes, while so-called explicit measures largely reflect the action of controlled processes. Instead, the data now suggest that responses on many measures are influenced by both automatic processes and controlled processes. Indeed, the data suggest that controlled processes can affect performance, even on so-called implicit tasks (Payne, 2001 (Payne, , 2005 Sherman, 2008) . It is for this reason that approaches such as the PDP are attractive. Rather than assuming that dependent measures are process pure, they admit to the possibility that they are not and actively assess the contributions of automatic processes and controlled processes to responding.
Coda
The results of the experiments described in the present article extend our knowledge in several ways. First, they support the notion that people make spontaneous trait inferences. Second, they confirm that this tendency can be sidetracked by instructions (search for graphemes in descriptions) that redirect the efforts of working memory and that use cognitive capacity. Third, the results demonstrate that trait inferences can have an impact on subsequent responding via automatic processes but that these influences can sometimes be moderated by controlled processes. Finally, we identify situations that independently influence the extent to which these processes affect subsequent responding. Such results open the door for new research that identifies additional conditions that influence the impact that inferences have on subsequent responses and the automatic processes and controlled processes that contribute to these effects.
